Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

7 October 2023–30 September 2026 (research cutoff).
October 2023–January 2025: Israeli assault, siege and mass displacement, sustained by U.S. arms, finance, intelligence and diplomacy.
January–March 2025 ceasefire followed by renewed large-scale hostilities; October 2025 ceasefire and subsequent implementation/violations form a distinct phase. [GZ02]
17 November 2025 onward: limited prospective UNSC 2803 stabilization mandate and U.S.-led transitional arrangements; these do not retroactively authorize earlier operations. [GZ30] [GZ31]
Latest casualty snapshot: 30 September 2026, webpage published 6 October 2026. [GZ32A] Keep historical background and regional case overlaps distinct; do not add the same harms or assistance twice. The former PSE-1948-01 synthesis identifier is no longer a live case.

Intervention documented

The United States financed and replenished Israel’s military and expedited arms transfers. Operational assistance included urban warfare advice, special-operations/intelligence cooperation in locating Hamas leaders, officially acknowledged unarmed surveillance flights over Gaza for hostage recovery, and reported live drone intelligence and support for a specific rescue operation. Regional force deployments protected Israel and deterred intervention; ceasefire vetoes and opposition to ICC accountability supplied diplomatic protection. [GZ01] [GZ03] [GZ56] [GZ57] [GZ58] [GZ59] [GZ61] [GZ65] [GZ10] [GZ71] [GZ72] [GZ27]
Later U.S. involvement included funding the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), ceasefire mediation, a coordination center in Israel, and U.S.-led transitional governance/stabilization arrangements. [GZ29] [GZ31] [GZ38] [GZ48]

Legal assessment

Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted

Critical U.S. offensive resupply and operational intelligence assistance materially sustained Israel’s Gaza campaign and ground a prima facie aggression finding through cumulative participation. The campaign exceeded an adequately demonstrated defensive basis and lacked Palestinian consent or Security Council authorization. The mandate adopted in November 2025 authorized prospective stabilization. [GZ01, GZ41, GZ42, GZ43, GZ44, GZ46, GZ53, GZ30]

The October 7 attack did not erase the occupation setting. The ICJ found that Israel retained key elements of effective control over Gaza after its 2005 withdrawal and remained bound by occupation duties commensurate with that control. It found Israel’s continued presence in the occupied territory unlawful and required other states not to assist in maintaining that situation. The 2024 opinion expressly excluded adjudication of Israel’s Gaza conduct in response to October 7; in October 2025, the Court separately confirmed that Israel’s occupation duties increased with its increased effective control. Human Rights Watch documented apartheid and persecution. [GZ11, GZ64, GZ77]

Palestinians possess a right to self-determination; resistance to occupation remains subject to humanitarian law. Deliberate attacks on civilians and hostage-taking are unlawful, as documented in the October 7 investigations. Israel’s protection of its population likewise cannot justify annexation, forced displacement, collective punishment or unlawful attacks. [GZ15, GZ16, GZ18, GZ41, GZ42, GZ64, GZ78]

U.S. support combined the $3.8bn annual military-aid framework with an additional $8.7bn in April 2024 military-financing and missile/laser-defense appropriations, offensive resupply, operational intelligence assistance, regional military protection and diplomatic backing. These are Israel-wide support figures, including defensive equipment, rather than Gaza-only expenditure; appropriations and sale ceilings are distinct from delivered weapons. The supplemental amount is already included in the CRS FY2024 $12.5bn total. [GZ01, GZ65, GZ66, GZ67, GZ68, GZ69, GZ70]

The State Department’s May 2024 report found it reasonable to assess that covered U.S. articles had been used inconsistently with IHL obligations or established civilian-harm mitigation practices, and accepted assurances for continued transfers. It did not reach definitive conclusions about particular articles and incidents. Biden acknowledged directing special-operations and intelligence cooperation in tracking Hamas leaders; Pentagon testimony confirmed advisers and unarmed hostage-recovery surveillance. These records do not prove direct U.S. participation in the encounter that killed Sinwar or in every Israeli operation. [GZ06, GZ56, GZ65, GZ05, GZ59]

Blinken and later Rubio invoked emergency arms-review waivers. Repeated 14–1 ceasefire vetoes and opposition to ICC action document political protection. Trump’s February 2025 Gaza ownership proposal is evidence of declared aims, not implementation. The later UNSC 2803 authorization for a temporary stabilization force does not retroactively authorize the earlier campaign. State responsibility for aid or assistance provides an additional route, subject to its distinct legal elements. [GZ51, GZ75, GZ71, GZ10, GZ72, GZ73, GZ27, GZ28, GZ30, GZ43]

We anticipate Israel will continue its military operations in Gaza in the near-term.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s December 2023 emergency determination linked this assessment to the sale of tank ammunition.

[GZ51] U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, emergency determination, 8 December 2023, and arms-sale transmittal 24-15, reproduced in Congressional Record, 12 December 2023, pp. S5915–S5916. Operational-need rationale on S5916; 13,981 120mm cartridges, estimated $106.5m ceiling. Approval, not proof of delivery; not added to aid totals.

Human consequences

OCHA’s snapshot dated 30 September 2026 (published on its webpage 6 October) reproduced 74,032 reported Palestinian deaths and 175,142 injuries from Gaza’s Ministry of Health, including civilians and combatants. The snapshot’s identified-victim demographic breakdown has a separate 31 December 2025 cutoff. [GZ32A]

The Gaza Mortality Survey estimated 75,200 violent deaths (95% CI 63,600–86,800) and 8,540 excess non-violent deaths (4,540–12,500) between 7 October 2023 and 5 January 2025. The study surveyed 2,000 households and used statistical adjustment, including displaced residents to represent inaccessible governorates. Its population estimates do not distinguish combatant status. The May 2026 correction changed fieldwork-supervision wording and an appendix; the reported mortality estimates remain unchanged. [GZ33, GZ47]

The Atlas adds the two central estimates to obtain about 83,740 for that survey period; this arithmetic does not supply a joint confidence interval or count subsequent deaths. The survey and later OCHA snapshot overlap and must not be added together. Neither supplies a U.S.-only death total. [GZ33, GZ32A]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

OCHA’s 30 September 2026 snapshot reproduced UNOSAT’s assessment that 82% of Gaza’s structures were damaged or destroyed as of 16 June 2026. The satellite-based percentage covers all structure types, not homes alone.

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$16.3 billion in U.S. military and missile-defense aid to Israel, FY2024–2025

The workbook uses the CRS series of US$12.5 billion in FY2024 and US$3.8 billion in FY2025. This is Israel-wide aid, including defensive equipment. Costs of War separately estimates US$21.7 billion under a wider budget scope that includes stock replenishment and related accounts. The counter uses the narrower CRS series once.

≈$16.6B in 2025 USD

The FY2024 and FY2025 aid amounts use CPI-U of 313.689 and 321.943. The figures measure funded aid and include equipment for missions beyond Gaza.

Included in the taxpayer subtotal.

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 92 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case PSE-2023-26-02.