Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

11 August 2017–26 September 2026 (research cutoff).
2017–20: military threats, financial/oil sanctions, recognition and support of Guaidó, pressure for Maduro’s departure.
2021–24: sanctions retained alongside negotiations and conditional relief; substantial policy variation.
2025–26: renewed coercion, maritime attacks/interdiction and December blockade; Operation Absolute Resolve, 3 January 2026; ensuing political/economic control arrangements. The 31 August 2026 oil agreement is described in a White House announcement; its implementation and claimed valuation were not independently audited. [V2, V3, V5, V6, V8, V9, V11, V23]

One connected policy/case row, not a claim that every year constituted armed conflict. The 2017 threat overlaps the preceding VEN-2014-17-02 row as a transition marker; do not duplicate its protest deaths or assistance.

Intervention documented

The United States used economic and diplomatic coercion, supported the opposition/interim government, threatened armed intervention, restricted sovereign/PDVSA financing and revenues, and blocked assets. It escalated to armed maritime enforcement, vessel attacks and a port-facility drone strike, then launched a direct air and ground assault that seized the incumbent leader and his wife. [V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7, V8, V9, V23]

The May 2020 Operation Gideon private armed plot has no established U.S. government direction. The January 2026 assault was an expressly acknowledged U.S. armed-forces operation. [V5, V10]

Legal assessment

Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted

The acknowledged January 2026 bombardment and forcible seizure of national leadership establish a prima facie case of aggression. The reviewed record does not establish prior valid consent, Security Council authority or necessary self-defense for that operation; Venezuela’s UN representative expressly protested it. [V8, V9, V18, V19, V20, V24]

The December 2025 OLC opinion addressed domestic presidential authority, acknowledged that the proposed operation would constitute armed conflict, and expressly withheld a definitive international-law conclusion. Its partially redacted alternative theories establish no valid prior consent. Domestic indictments and later cooperation do not themselves authorize the initial force; sanctions and maritime operations require separate assessments. [VA2, V8, V11, V21]

We're going to run the country

President Trump described his intended U.S. role after the January 2026 operation.

[V9] President Trump and Gen. Dan Caine, news conference, Palm Beach, 3 January 2026, opening remarks and Caine operational briefing; official presidential transcript reproduced by American Presidency Project.

Human consequences

The New Yorker reported that Monitor de Víctimas had verified 80 deaths by 18 January 2026, including 32 Cubans. The article documented civilian deaths and destruction in residential areas. [V15]

Other reports gave different categories and cutoffs: approximately 75 total deaths in an anonymous U.S.-official assessment, 100 in Interior Minister Cabello’s statement, and 47 Venezuelan soldiers in Defense Minister Padrino’s later count. Their different categories and cutoffs prevent treating them as a single range or adding them together. [V14, V16, V17]

CEPR estimated that sanctions caused more than 40,000 deaths in 2017–2018; other researchers contest that causal estimate. GAO documented the wider economic/humanitarian crisis and implementation risks, without validating the mortality claim. The contested estimate is excluded from the January 2026 operation count. [V12, V13, V7]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$507 million in USAID obligations for the regional response, FY2017–2019

USAID’s inspector general reports US$260 million for humanitarian assistance and US$247 million for development across six countries. A US$200 million grant agreement for separate programs does not establish spending for covert operations or the January 2026 raid.

The regional assistance figures do not isolate federal costs of the military operation.

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 18 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case VEN-2017-26-03.