Conduct and chronology
Dates and phases
13–24 June 2025, covering the twelve-day Israel–Iran war and associated U.S. support. Direct U.S. bombing took place on the night of 21 June U.S. time, early 22 June in Iran, as Operation Midnight Hammer. Iran struck Al Udeid in Qatar on 23 June, and a ceasefire followed on 24 June. [IR09, IR10]
The 2015 JCPOA, U.S. withdrawal in May 2018, and subsequent restrictions on verification and departures from commitments supply the nuclear-diplomacy background. The 2026 campaign is assessed in IRN-2026-04. [IR01, IR02, IR03, IR04, IR05]
Intervention documented
U.S. aircraft and a submarine launched strikes on three Iranian nuclear complexes. CRS and the official operational account identify B-2 bombers, ground-penetrating bombs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. U.S. forces also participated in missile defense during the wider war. CRS documents Israel’s dependence on U.S.-supplied aircraft, munitions and annual military aid. [IR09, IR10, IR25]
The President and U.S. Article 51 notification expressly acknowledge U.S. authorization and the claimed collective-defense rationale. Sanctions and nuclear diplomacy form the background to the force assessed here. [IR03, IR11, IR12, IR13]
Legal assessment
Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted
The U.S. bombardment of Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on 21–22 June 2025 constitutes a strong prima facie case of aggression. Trump acknowledged directing the strikes. The bombardment category in Resolution 3314, article 3(b), supplies the relevant form of force, subject to the Charter assessment. [IR11, IR12, IR25, IRL1, IRL2]
Washington invoked collective self-defense of Israel in the presidential notification of 23 June and the Article 51 letter of 27 June. Israel’s own letter asserted nuclear imminence, missile and proxy attacks, and an ongoing armed conflict. Those asserted grounds require examination against the sequence recorded by CRS, including Israel’s 13 June offensive and Iran’s subsequent missile attacks. The evidence does not establish that the three-site bombardment was a necessary and proportionate response to an Iranian armed attack. The asserted collective-defense grounds therefore do not defeat the prima facie case. [IR09, IR12, IR13, IR14, IRL3]
The IAEA’s May 2025 assessment identified unresolved safeguards issues and could not assure an exclusively peaceful programme, while finding no credible indications of an ongoing undeclared structured programme of the earlier type. Its June Board resolution found safeguards non-compliance. Safeguards non-compliance does not itself authorize bombardment; a defensive use of force must satisfy the Charter’s armed-attack, necessity and proportionality requirements. Later Iranian attacks cannot retrospectively establish necessity at the moment of the initial U.S. strikes. [IR06, IR07, IRL1, IRL3]
collective self-defense of our ally, Israel
President Trump invoked this rationale in his June 2025 notification to Congress after strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.
Donald J. Trump, letter to Congress on U.S. military operations in Iran, 23 June 2025Human consequences
HRANA recorded 1,190 deaths in Iran across the 13–24 June 2025 war, including civilians and military personnel. Its count covers the wider war and does not isolate deaths from the three U.S. nuclear-site strikes. [IR09, IR10, IR17]
On 23 June, the IAEA documented damage at all three complexes. Underground damage at Fordow had not yet been fully assessed. Iran reported to the IAEA that off-site radiation levels had not increased at the three sites. [IR15]
Sources for victim figures
- Reported deaths across the wider June 2025 Iran–Israel war
Physical destruction
On 23 June 2025, the IAEA reported damage at Fordow, Esfahan and Natanz. The agency’s assessment of damage to the underground facilities at Fordow was still incomplete.
Economic costs
Cost to U.S. taxpayers
US$181–248 million estimated for preparations and the June 2025 strikes
The workbook reports Linda Bilmes’s wider US$2.04–2.26 billion range, including missile interceptors defending Israel and Al Udeid. The subtotal uses the rows for preparations, aircraft operations and depreciation, and munitions for the attack.
$181–248M in 2025 USD
The calculation subtracts the THAAD and Patriot defense components from Bilmes’s Table 4 endpoints, in FY2025 dollars.
Included in the taxpayer subtotal.
Economic cost to victims
Unquantified
Sources and citation
Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.
- [IR11] Trump, Address to the Nation on United States Airstrikes on Iran, 21 June 2025, DCPD-202500711, pp.1–2: stated objective, outcome claim and coordination with Netanyahu.
- [IR01] UN Security Council, Resolution 2231 (2015), 20 July 2015, paras.1–2 and Annex A (JCPOA, 14 July 2015), enrichment/monitoring and sanctions provisions.
- [IR02] Obama White House, Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 14 July 2015, Nuclear; Transparency; Sanctions.
- [IR04] IAEA, GOV/2025/50, Verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UNSCR 2231, 3 September 2025, derestricted 11 September, paragraphs 3–8, implementation and subsequent departures from commitments.
- [IR05] IAEA, GOV/INF/2019/8, 1 July 2019, paras.2–3: verified enriched-uranium stockpile exceeded the JCPOA ceiling.
- [IR06] IAEA, GOV/2025/25, NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran, 31 May 2025, paras.77–86, especially 79, 80 and 86: past undeclared programme, no credible indication of its ongoing equivalent, enrichment, unresolved safeguards and inability to assure an exclusively peaceful programme.
- [IR07] IAEA Board, GOV/2025/38, 12 June 2025, operative paras.3–5 and 10–11: safeguards non-compliance, inability to verify non-diversion, support for diplomacy. Primary document reproduced by Iran Watch.
- [IR08] ODNI, DNI Tulsi Gabbard, Annual Threat Assessment opening statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee, 25 March 2025, Iran paragraphs.
Show 15 additional references
- [IR09] CRS, IF13032, Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire, updated 26 June 2025, opening sections and Historical Background. USG report reproduced by EveryCRSReport.
- [IR10] CRS, IN12571, U.S. Strikes on Nuclear Sites in Iran, 23 June 2025, Iran-Israel Conflict; Operation Midnight Hammer; Congressional Responses. USG report reproduction.
- [IR12] President Donald J. Trump, Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Iran, 23 June 2025, DCPD-202500715.
- [IR15] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, 23 June 2025, Fordow/Esfahan/Natanz damage and radiation update.
- [IR16] Linda J. Bilmes, Costs of United States Military Activities in the Wider Middle East Since October 7, 2023, Costs of War, 7 October 2025, pp.12–14, Table 4 and assumptions.
- [IR17] HRANA, Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran-Israel War, June 2025, pp.12–13 (Human Casualties; Breakdown of Victims). Independent monitoring, not a U.S.-strike-only tally.
- [IR18] UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, A/HRC/61/60, 19 March 2026, paras.53–56 and 67–75, June 2025 hostilities and repression. Primary report reproduced by ecoi.net; the host filename differs from the document's printed symbol.
- [IR25] Air National Guard/DVIDS, Missouri Guard Airmen Play Critical Role in Iran Nuclear Strike Mission, 27 June 2025: official operational account and Hegseth/Caine statements.
- [IR13] Dorothy Shea, U.S. chargé d’affaires, letter to the President of the Security Council, 27 June 2025, S/2025/426, pp. 1–2, Article 51 notification and asserted grounds for collective self-defense.
- [IR14] Israel, letters of 17 June 2025, S/2025/390 (issued 19 June), annex pp.2–3: asserted nuclear imminence, missile/proxy attacks and ongoing-conflict theory.
- [IR03] Trump, presidential memorandum, Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA…, 8 May 2018, §§1–3: withdrawal and restoration of sanctions.
- [IR19] U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote 328, 27 June 2025: motion to discharge S.J.Res.59, 47–53, rejected.
- [IRL1] United Nations Charter, articles 2(4) and 51, prohibition of force and self-defense; official U.N. text.
- [IRL2] U.N. General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, annex articles 2, 3(b) and 5; U.N. Audiovisual Library collection and resolution text.
- [IRL3] ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, merits judgment, 27 June 1986, paragraphs 194–199, necessity, proportionality and collective-defense conditions. Paragraph 194 expressly leaves anticipatory self-defense undecided. Judgment reproduced by Justia.
Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case IRN-2025-03.
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