Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

28 February–29 September 2026, the research cutoff. The initial U.S.–Israeli air campaign was followed by an April ceasefire, maritime operations and a U.S. blockade of Iranian ports from 13 April. The blockade ended on 18 June following a memorandum of understanding and resumed on 14 July after renewed fighting. [I2605, I2611, I2612, I2613]

The September CRS report describes the collapse of the June agreement and continued confrontation. The 29 September Reuters report records disputed proposals for further talks and sanctions relief. This dossier concerns the 2026 campaign. The June 2025 strikes are assessed in IRN-2025-03. [I2613, I2614]

Intervention documented

Operation Epic Fury involved direct U.S. air and missile attacks, coordinated with Israel, followed by maritime combat and a blockade of Iranian ports. The presidential notification, Article 51 letter and Lead Inspector General report document state authorization, declared objectives and military operations. [I2604, I2605, I2606, I2612]

CENTCOM’s announced blockade and its report of disabling and boarding the vessel Touska document the maritime force assessed here. The subsequent cessation and reinstatement of the blockade are recorded by CRS. Sanctions and diplomacy accompanied these operations. [I2611, I26REV1, I2613]

Legal assessment

Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted

The U.S. bombardment beginning on 28 February 2026 constitutes a strong prima facie case of aggression. Trump’s announcement and congressional notification acknowledge the operation and its authorization. Resolution 3314, article 3(b), identifies bombardment as a form of aggression subject to the Charter assessment. [I2604, I2605, I2623, I2625]

Washington’s Article 51 letter invokes individual and collective self-defense and a continuing conflict, citing Iranian missile and proxy attacks and threats to U.S. forces and Israel. Rubio described anticipated Iranian retaliation following an expected Israeli operation. The evidence does not establish that the opening nationwide campaign was a necessary and proportionate response to an Iranian armed attack. Preventive disarmament and a political objective of changing Iran’s government do not independently supply a Charter authorization. [I2604, I2605, I2606, I2608, I2624, I2631]

Iran’s subsequent attacks on other states and the requests for defensive assistance described by the United Kingdom require their own assessment. Resolution 2817 condemned Iranian attacks and demanded their cessation, without authorizing the opening U.S. bombardment. The blockade of Iranian ports separately engages article 3(c) and requires a Charter justification for the period and conduct concerned. [I2611, I2613, I2621, I2622, I2624, I2625]

We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action.

Rubio explained that anticipated retaliation against U.S. forces following an expected Israeli operation prompted preemptive U.S. strikes. The excerpt forms part of that explanation.

Marco Rubio’s remarks to reporters, Washington, 2 March 2026, Reuters original video and transcript, soundbite 4

Human consequences

HRANA recorded at least 3,636 deaths within Iran, including 1,701 civilians, from 28 February through the first day of the April 2026 ceasefire. Its report dates that endpoint to 8 April Eastern Time, corresponding to 9 April in Iran. The figures cover combined U.S.–Israeli attacks through that date; they do not isolate a U.S.-only subtotal. [I2617]

The U.N. fact-finding mission’s September report found reasonable grounds to attribute the 28 February Minab and Lamerd strikes to U.S. forces. It recorded more than 150 deaths at Minab’s school and a reported 22 deaths in Lamerd, including the surrounding neighborhood, and found reasonable grounds to believe the strikes constituted war crimes. The report also records CENTCOM’s denial of responsibility for Lamerd. The incident counts may overlap the HRANA aggregate. [I2618]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$38.1 billion in additional DoD costs estimated through 1 August 2026

CBO includes replacement of munitions and lost equipment, additional operations, and fuel effects, including a fiscal-year fuel projection. Other federal costs and some base repairs are outside the estimate. The earlier DoD figure covers many of the same costs.

≈$36.7B in 2025 USD

July 2026 CPI-U of 333.918 serves as the timing proxy for the cumulative cost through 1 August.

Included in the taxpayer subtotal.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 44 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case IRN-2026-04.