Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

Core phase: 21 November 2013–27 February 2014; Yanukovych's removal on 22 February and formation of the Yatsenyuk government on 27 February. Aid since 1991 and NATO policy in 2008 are antecedents. Odesa, 2 May 2014, and armed-group support/abuses after May 2014 are dated aftermath, not evidence that every later relationship existed during Maidan. [UKR9, UKR14, UKR24, UKR36]

Intervention documented

Washington funded democracy, civil-society and institutional programs; supported Ukraine’s European/Euro-Atlantic orientation; engaged the government and opposition; publicly backed Maidan; promoted its preferences for a new government’s personnel; and recognized and supported the successor government. The leaked Nuland–Pyatt call directly records those personnel preferences and diplomatic planning. [UKR1, UKR2, UKR3, UKR4, UKR5, UKR6, UKR7, UKR10, UKR11]

Maté interprets U.S. political funding and the Nuland–Pyatt call as evidence of coordinated government change, relying partly on Andrii Telizhenko’s retrospective account. Horton’s published footnotes supply a source map; neither is recipient-level proof of U.S. military sponsorship of Maidan violence. The public record does not establish U.S. government arms, military trainers or recipient-specific funding for Right Sector or C14 before the February 2014 change of government. The Canadian immigration-board digest describes Right Sector’s local weapons seizures during that period. [UKR12, UKR37, UKR39, UKR40, UKR41]

Azov was formed on 5 May 2014, after Yanukovych’s removal. DFRLab documented U.S.-origin PSRL-1 launchers in Azov’s 2017 training posts and reported commercial export approvals; its follow-up recorded the National Guard’s denial and distinguished training evidence from combat use. Grayzone reported U.S. military-adviser contact with Azov in November 2017; its photographs document contact, not a training or command program. U.S. forces trained Ukrainian National Guard formations from 2015, and the 2017 appropriations act prohibited the act’s funds from aiding Azov. These later facts do not establish that Washington armed or directed the February 2014 violence. [UKR14, UKR16, UKR17, UKR17A, UKR18, UKR19, UKR38, UKR38A]

Legal assessment

Insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of U.S. aggression or assistance to aggression; further investigation may be warranted

U.S. political intervention in the Maidan phase is documented; armed aggression is insufficiently established. Washington supplied general assistance, engaged in diplomacy and promoted its preferences for government personnel. The reviewed sources do not sufficiently establish recipient-specific U.S. arming, military training, sending or substantial operational involvement in qualifying Maidan violence. Later relationships and the subsequent war cannot retrospectively establish that nexus. [UKR1, UKR2, UKR3, UKR8, UKR16, UKR17, UKR37, UKR39, UKR41, UKR42]

Yats is the guy

Victoria Nuland expressed her preference for Arseniy Yatsenyuk in a recorded call with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt.

[UKR3] BBC, transcript of leaked Nuland–Pyatt call, 7 February 2014, reproduced at unvis.it. Recording is a leaked primary document, not a declassified FRUS release; original recording date uncertain.

Human consequences

OHCHR identified 98 violent deaths during 21 January–20 February 2014: 83 protesters, one journalist, one bystander and 13 law-enforcement officers. The separate 2 May 2014 Odesa events caused 48 deaths; OHCHR described violence by both groups and failures by police and rescue services. Neither count isolates deaths attributable to the United States. Subsequent nationwide war deaths fall outside these Maidan and Odesa cohorts. [UKR23, UKR24]

The ECtHR’s 2025 Odesa judgment found that Ukrainian authorities failed to prevent and stop the violence, provide timely rescue and investigate effectively. [UKR25]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

More than US$100 million in U.S. assistance to Ukraine in FY2013

The State Department reported more than US$5 billion in assistance since 1991. The FY2013 amount includes reforms, institutions and other programs. The available records do not identify an amount used to finance violence or Maidan operations.

≈$138M in 2025 USD

The 2013 CPI-U of 232.957 applies to the reported floor for general assistance.

The taxpayer subtotal covers prima facie findings of aggression or assistance to aggression.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 31 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case UKR-2013-01.