Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

November 2002–30 September 2026 research window, with distinct phases rather than continuous combat: counterterrorism strikes/raids from 2002; support for Saudi/UAE intervention from March 2015; direct anti-Houthi radar strikes in October 2016; maritime interception and land strikes in 2024–25; Operation Rough Rider, 15 March–6 May 2025. The Oman-mediated U.S.–Houthi truce is an endpoint for that campaign, not a settlement of Yemen's civil war. Later developments are separately dated. [YEM01] [YEM13] [YEM14] [YEM18] [YEM20]

Intervention documented

The CIA and U.S. military conducted drone, missile and air strikes and occasional raids against al-Qaeda/AQAP. The United States also cooperated militarily with Yemeni authorities, supplied arms, intelligence, logistics, planning and, previously, aerial refueling to the Saudi-led coalition, and conducted direct naval and air operations against the Houthis. AQAP and the Houthis are distinct organizations. Direct U.S. attacks and U.S. assistance to allied operations carry separate attribution and legal questions. [YEM01] [YEM02] [YEM04] [YEM06] [YEM14] [YEM19]

Legal assessment

Insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of U.S. aggression or assistance to aggression; further investigation may be warranted

Insufficiently established as U.S. aggression. U.S. planning, intelligence, arms transfers, maintenance and, until November 2018, aerial refueling materially sustained coalition operations. GAO found that State and DOD had not fully determined how this support contributed to or reduced civilian harm. [YEM04; YEM06; YEM10.] The UN panel documented Emirati attacks on the inviting government’s forces in August 2019, directly putting the scope of consent in issue. The UAE invoked self-defense against alleged threats to coalition forces; U.S. responsibility requires a link between particular assistance and an identified wrongful operation. [YEM41, pp. 7, 69; YEM42; YEM37, arts. 16, 20.] Hadi’s invitation and UN recognition rebut treating the entire coalition intervention as aggression, while Resolution 2216 supplied no general authorization for war. Aid or assistance responsibility under Article 16 and U.S. commission of aggression through substantial involvement are distinct claims; the reviewed record does not establish either basis for an affirmative classification. [YEM05, preamble and operative paras. 8–16; YEM36; YEM37; YEM39, paras. 194–199.] Direct U.S. counterterrorism strikes, radar strikes and later anti-Houthi campaigns are separate uses of U.S. force whose legal grounds turn on the consent, necessity and proportionality of each operation. Renewed Yemeni fighting in 2026 is separately dated; the July 2026 CRS report still described the U.S.–Houthi truce as holding. [YEM01; YEM13, YEM14, YEM15, YEM16, YEM17; YEM20; YEM31; YEM32.]

logistical and intelligence support

In March 2015, the White House announced the U.S. role in support of the Saudi-led intervention.

[YEM04] White House, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, 25 March 2015, presidential authorization and Joint Planning Cell.

Human consequences

UNDP’s 2021 counterfactual model projected 377,000 conflict-related deaths by the end of 2021: 154,000 from combat/violence and 223,000 indirectly. The estimate covers all belligerents through that year, not a U.S.-caused aggregate or later conflict. Bombardment, blockade, displacement and damaged services caused mass suffering. UN investigators documented serious violations by coalition and Houthi forces. [YEM28, pp. 12, 30–32; YEM11, paras. 14–15, 102–105.]

For the separate 2025 U.S. campaign, the August 2026 U.S. civilian-casualty report’s table records 153 civilians killed and 243 injured in three Yemen strikes. The report’s Saada narrative reverses that incident’s killed/injured values relative to the table and headline total, leaving an internal discrepancy. Airwars’ June 2025 campaign assessment reported at least 224 civilian deaths using its own incident methodology. These overlapping assessments cannot be added. [YEM21, pp. 3, 5–6; YEM23; YEM24.]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

U.S. strikes on 17–18 April 2025 destroyed fuel tanks and port infrastructure at Ras Issa. HRW examined satellite imagery and source interviews, reported reduced operations, and assessed the strikes as an apparent war crime warranting investigation. [YEM26.]

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$2.76–4.95 billion in estimated U.S. Houthi-related and regional military costs in FY2025

The independent estimate covers operations from October 2024 to mid-September 2025, including regional deployments. GAO’s separate US$54.6 billion Saudi/UAE support benchmark largely reflects partner-financed sales.

$2.76–4.95B in 2025 USD

The FY2025 estimate serves as the 2025 price proxy.

The taxpayer subtotal covers prima facie findings of aggression or assistance to aggression.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 43 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case YEM-2002-26-01.