Conduct and chronology
Dates and phases
November 2002–30 September 2026 research window, with distinct phases rather than continuous combat: counterterrorism strikes/raids from 2002; support for Saudi/UAE intervention from March 2015; direct anti-Houthi radar strikes in October 2016; maritime interception and land strikes in 2024–25; Operation Rough Rider, 15 March–6 May 2025. The Oman-mediated U.S.–Houthi truce is an endpoint for that campaign, not a settlement of Yemen's civil war. Later developments are separately dated. [YEM01] [YEM13] [YEM14] [YEM18] [YEM20]
Intervention documented
The CIA and U.S. military conducted drone, missile and air strikes and occasional raids against al-Qaeda/AQAP. The United States also cooperated militarily with Yemeni authorities, supplied arms, intelligence, logistics, planning and, previously, aerial refueling to the Saudi-led coalition, and conducted direct naval and air operations against the Houthis. AQAP and the Houthis are distinct organizations. Direct U.S. attacks and U.S. assistance to allied operations carry separate attribution and legal questions. [YEM01] [YEM02] [YEM04] [YEM06] [YEM14] [YEM19]
Legal assessment
Insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of U.S. aggression or assistance to aggression; further investigation may be warranted
Insufficiently established as U.S. aggression. U.S. planning, intelligence, arms transfers, maintenance and, until November 2018, aerial refueling materially sustained coalition operations. GAO found that State and DOD had not fully determined how this support contributed to or reduced civilian harm. [YEM04; YEM06; YEM10.] The UN panel documented Emirati attacks on the inviting government’s forces in August 2019, directly putting the scope of consent in issue. The UAE invoked self-defense against alleged threats to coalition forces; U.S. responsibility requires a link between particular assistance and an identified wrongful operation. [YEM41, pp. 7, 69; YEM42; YEM37, arts. 16, 20.] Hadi’s invitation and UN recognition rebut treating the entire coalition intervention as aggression, while Resolution 2216 supplied no general authorization for war. Aid or assistance responsibility under Article 16 and U.S. commission of aggression through substantial involvement are distinct claims; the reviewed record does not establish either basis for an affirmative classification. [YEM05, preamble and operative paras. 8–16; YEM36; YEM37; YEM39, paras. 194–199.] Direct U.S. counterterrorism strikes, radar strikes and later anti-Houthi campaigns are separate uses of U.S. force whose legal grounds turn on the consent, necessity and proportionality of each operation. Renewed Yemeni fighting in 2026 is separately dated; the July 2026 CRS report still described the U.S.–Houthi truce as holding. [YEM01; YEM13, YEM14, YEM15, YEM16, YEM17; YEM20; YEM31; YEM32.]
logistical and intelligence support
In March 2015, the White House announced the U.S. role in support of the Saudi-led intervention.
[YEM04] White House, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, 25 March 2015, presidential authorization and Joint Planning Cell.Human consequences
UNDP’s 2021 counterfactual model projected 377,000 conflict-related deaths by the end of 2021: 154,000 from combat/violence and 223,000 indirectly. The estimate covers all belligerents through that year, not a U.S.-caused aggregate or later conflict. Bombardment, blockade, displacement and damaged services caused mass suffering. UN investigators documented serious violations by coalition and Houthi forces. [YEM28, pp. 12, 30–32; YEM11, paras. 14–15, 102–105.]
For the separate 2025 U.S. campaign, the August 2026 U.S. civilian-casualty report’s table records 153 civilians killed and 243 injured in three Yemen strikes. The report’s Saada narrative reverses that incident’s killed/injured values relative to the table and headline total, leaving an internal discrepancy. Airwars’ June 2025 campaign assessment reported at least 224 civilian deaths using its own incident methodology. These overlapping assessments cannot be added. [YEM21, pp. 3, 5–6; YEM23; YEM24.]
Sources for victim figures
- Projected direct and indirect conflict-related deaths through 2021
- U.S. acknowledged civilian deaths and injuries in three 2025 Yemen strikes; table/narrative discrepancy retained
- Airwars’ independently assessed civilian deaths during Operation Rough Rider, June 2025 snapshot
- [YEM23] Airwars, Operation Rough Rider, 18 June 2025, seven-week campaign civilian-death findings and comparison with earlier U.S. actions; dated snapshot.
- [YEM24] Airwars, Methodology Note: US Forces in Yemen, 2025, source assessment and exceptional inclusion of eight single-source/four contested incidents in the comparison.
Physical destruction
U.S. strikes on 17–18 April 2025 destroyed fuel tanks and port infrastructure at Ras Issa. HRW examined satellite imagery and source interviews, reported reduced operations, and assessed the strikes as an apparent war crime warranting investigation. [YEM26.]
Economic costs
Cost to U.S. taxpayers
US$2.76–4.95 billion in estimated U.S. Houthi-related and regional military costs in FY2025
The independent estimate covers operations from October 2024 to mid-September 2025, including regional deployments. GAO’s separate US$54.6 billion Saudi/UAE support benchmark largely reflects partner-financed sales.
$2.76–4.95B in 2025 USD
The FY2025 estimate serves as the 2025 price proxy.
The taxpayer subtotal covers prima facie findings of aggression or assistance to aggression.
- Linda J. Bilmes, Costs of United States Military Activities in the Wider Middle East Since October 7, 2023, Costs of War, 7 October 2025, pp. 1–3, Table 2; FY2025 window through 15 September.
- GAO, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, GAO-22-105988, 15 June 2022, Highlights/What GAO Found.
Economic cost to victims
Unquantified
Sources and citation
Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.
- [YEM01] CRS, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, RL34170, 10 June 2008, counterterrorism cooperation and November 2002 strike; CRS report reproduced by EveryCRSReport.
- [YEM02] President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff change-of-office ceremony, 30 September 2011, opening paragraphs on Anwar al-Awlaki and Yemeni cooperation.
- [YEM03] Human Rights Watch, Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen, 22 October 2013, Al-Majalah case study, 17 December 2009.
- [YEM04] White House, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, 25 March 2015, presidential authorization and Joint Planning Cell.
- [YEM05] UN Security Council, Resolution 2216, 14 April 2015, preamble on Hadi's request/recognition; operative paras. 8–9, 14–16. Official resolution reproduced by SIPRI.
- [YEM06] Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Statement on Refueling Saudi Coalition Aircraft, 9 November 2018, transfer to coalition-owned refueling capabilities.
- [YEM07] President Donald Trump, Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J.Res.7, 16 April 2019, forms of support, Iran/alliance rationale and interpretation of hostilities.
- [YEM08] U.S. Congress, House Calendar, 116th Congress, history of S.J.Res.7, 16 April veto and 2 May 2019 Senate override vote, 53–45.
Show 43 additional references
- [YEM09] State Department, Department Press Briefing, 5 February 2021, Yemen offensive-support policy and AQAP/ISIS exception following Biden's 4 February announcement.
- [YEM10] GAO, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, GAO-22-105988, 15 June 2022, Highlights/What GAO Found.
- [YEM11] UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, A/HRC/45/6, 28 September 2020, paras. 14–15 and 102–105: civilian harm and third-state arms-transfer concerns.
- [YEM12] UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, Detailed Findings, A/HRC/45/CRP.7, 29 September 2020, paras. 414–416, third-state arms transfers and aiding/assisting responsibility.
- [YEM13] President Barack Obama, Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution, 14 October 2016, 12 October strikes and alleged 9/12 October antiship launches.
- [YEM14] President Joe Biden, Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Yemen, 12 January 2024, DCPD-202400022, Houthi attacks and U.S. domestic/international legal claims.
- [YEM15] UK Government, Summary of the UK Government Legal Position: The Legality of UK Military Action to Target Houthi Facilities in Yemen, 12 January 2024, attack on HMS Diamond, necessity and proportionality.
- [YEM16] Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Netherlands, UK and US, Joint Statement on Additional Strikes Against the Houthis in Yemen, 22 January 2024, distinction between US/UK strikes and supporting partners.
- [YEM17] UN Security Council, Resolution 2722, 10 January 2024, operative paras. 2–3 and 7–8, maritime attacks, defense of vessels, root causes and restraint.
- [YEM18] President Donald Trump, Statement on United States Airstrikes Against the Houthi Rebel Group in Yemen, 15 March 2025, DCPD-202500362, objectives and account of earlier attacks.
- [YEM19] USCENTCOM, USCENTCOM Forces Continue to Target Houthi Terrorists, 27 April 2025, more than 800 targets, claimed fighter losses, Ras Isa and stated objectives.
- [YEM20] Oman Foreign Ministry, Oman announces ceasefire agreement between Washington and Sanaa, 6 May 2025, reciprocal non-targeting commitment. Ministry-hosted unofficial English version of its Arabic statement.
- [YEM21] U.S. Department of Defense/War, Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection with United States Military Operations in 2025, submitted August 2026; pp. 3, 5–6, Yemen table and scope; assessment cutoff 1 February 2026. The p. 6 Saada narrative reverses killed/injured relative to the p. 5 table and headline totals; O retains the table-based values and explicitly flags the discrepancy. Official Senate-hosted PDF.
- [YEM22] Senator Jack Reed, Reed Statement on DOD Civilian Casualty Report, 13 August 2026, opening summary, link to report and demand for oversight.
- [YEM23] Airwars, Operation Rough Rider, 18 June 2025, seven-week campaign civilian-death findings and comparison with earlier U.S. actions; dated snapshot.
- [YEM24] Airwars, Methodology Note: US Forces in Yemen, 2025, source assessment and exceptional inclusion of eight single-source/four contested incidents in the comparison.
- [YEM25] Airwars, The U.S. accepts killing more than 140 civilians in just two strikes, 13 August 2026, Yemen incident breakdown, government acknowledgment and pending allegations.
- [YEM26] Human Rights Watch, Yemen: US Strikes on Port an Apparent War Crime, 4 June 2025, Ras Issa/Ras Isa investigation and request for a war-crimes investigation.
- [YEM27] Amnesty International, Yemen: One year on, impunity for detention centre strike exposes US failures on accountability and civilian harm prevention, 29 April 2026, Saada survivor interviews and investigation demand; predates August acknowledgment.
- [YEM28] UNDP / Pardee Center, Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery, 23 November 2021, pp. 12, 28–32 and Figure 3, International Futures counterfactual model.
- [YEM29] Linda J. Bilmes, Costs of United States Military Activities in the Wider Middle East Since October 7, 2023, Costs of War, 7 October 2025, pp. 1–3, Table 2; FY2025 window through 15 September.
- [YEM30] CRS, Yemen: In Brief, R48942, 12 May 2026, political background, government fragmentation, Saudi/UAE differences and U.S. policy. CRS report reproduced by EveryCRSReport.
- [YEM31] CRS, Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy, IF12581, updated 21 July 2026, maritime campaigns and post-May 2025 developments, including the continuing U.S.–Houthi truce. CRS report reproduced by EveryCRSReport.
- [YEM32] Associated Press, UN envoy meets Houthi negotiators in a bid to halt escalating violence in Yemen, 29 September 2026, Muscat diplomacy and renewed Yemeni fighting. Contemporary reporting, not an official USG finding.
- [YEM33] U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, Bin Ali Jaber v. United States, No. 16-5093, 30 June 2017, opinion pp. 8–15, political-question dismissal. Judicial opinion reproduced by Justia; official PDF retrieval failed.
- [YEM34] U.S. Supreme Court, docket 17-472, Ahmed Salem Bin Ali Jaber et al. v. United States et al., entry of 27 November 2017: certiorari denied.
- [YEM35] United Nations Charter, arts. 2(4) and 51, prohibition on force and individual/collective self-defense; official UN full text.
- [YEM36] UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, annex arts. 2, 3(b)–(c), 5, bombardment/blockade and assessment of aggression; official UN documentary collection, also used in this workbook's existing legal framework.
- [YEM37] ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), arts. 4, 8, 16 and 20; UN Audiovisual Library account and document collection.
- [YEM38] ICC Review Conference, RC/Res.6, 11 June 2010, annex I, arts. 8 bis, 15 bis(5), 15 ter; annex III, understandings 6–7. Resolution reproduction used in this workbook's legal framework.
- [YEM39] ICJ, Nicaragua v. United States, merits judgment, 27 June 1986, paras. 194–199: necessity, proportionality and request for collective defense. Judicial text reproduced by Justia; workbook legal-framework source.
- [YEM40] ICC Assembly of States Parties, States Parties to the Rome Statute, membership list, checked in this study 29 September 2026; neither the United States nor Yemen is listed.
- Bernadette Meehan, White House statement on the situation in Yemen, 25 March 2015.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, GAO-22-105988, June 2022.
- [YEM41] UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, final report, S/2020/70, 27 January 2020, p. 7 (29 August UAE strikes on Government forces) and p. 69 n. 46 (UAE’s response and claimed AQAP threat). Primary report reproduced by Security Council Report.
- [YEM42] UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Affirms Efforts to Neutralise Terror Threats to Coalition Forces,” 30 August 2019; acknowledges 28–29 August air operations and asserts self-defense. A party’s explanation, not an independent finding.
- [YEM43] U.S. Department of Defense, press briefing by Secretary Ash Carter and Gen. Martin Dempsey, Pentagon, 16 April 2015; Yemen support/targeting discussion.
- U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, Review of the Department of State’s Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, ISP-I-20-19.
- [YEM44] James N. Mattis, “Statement on Actions of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen,” 12 September 2018 (correcting prior August label); endorsement of State Department certification, a U.S. policy assessment rather than independent verification of compliance.
- Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” 4 February 2021.
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, The Yemen War in Numbers: Saudi Escalation and U.S. Complicity.
- Associated Press, “Airport in Saudi Capital of Riyadh Is Struck Again as Toll Rises.”
- [APP-N5] U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, arts. 39–42, 51; Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 20 & cmt., in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 26 (2001),
Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case YEM-2002-26-01.
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