Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

Two separate military episodes: 15 July–25 October 1958; and 25 August 1982–30 March 1984. First MNF deployment: 25 August–10 September 1982; second landing: 29 September 1982; Marines redeployed offshore on 26 February 1984, with subsequent naval fire reported through 29 February; U.S. MNF participation formally ended on 30 March. [LBN02] [LBN08] [LBN10] [LBN12] [LBN17] [LBN20]

The 1957 political crisis and the 1975–82 civil war/Israeli invasion are background. This is a country case containing distinct phases, not continuous U.S. warfare from 1958 to 1984. Later U.S. support and Israeli wars in Lebanon require separately dated cases.

Intervention documented

1958: amphibious landing, Army reinforcement, control/protection of strategic Beirut facilities, and military backing of an existing government alongside negotiated succession. [LBN02] [LBN07]
1982–84: diplomatic mediation and PLO evacuation; armed MNF presence; training, ammunition, intelligence and financial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); ground exchanges, naval bombardment and carrier air strikes against militia/Syrian positions. [LBN10] [LBN13] [LBN15] [LBN17]
Related support to Israel included U.S.-origin weaponry used in Lebanon, with official concern over misuse and a selective cluster-bomb export suspension. Supplier responsibility and direct U.S. combat are assessed separately. [LBN25]

Legal assessment

Insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of U.S. aggression or assistance to aggression; further investigation may be warranted

Lebanese government invitations support the initial U.S. deployments. [LBN02, LBN05, LBN12] U.S. forces later carried out naval bombardment and air strikes, but the evidence does not identify a sufficiently established operation outside valid consent or necessary defense to sustain a prima facie aggression finding for 1983–1984. [LBN13, LBN15, LBN17, LBN20, LBN29, LBN30, LBN31, LBN33] U.S.-origin weapons also supported Israeli operations; a finding of assistance to aggression requires a demonstrated connection to specified unlawful armed acts beyond the supply record alone. [LBN25, LBN32, LBN33]

will not engage in combat

In September 1982, President Reagan described the multinational force’s U.S. role in these terms and reserved the right of self-defense.

[LBN12] Ronald Reagan, Letter to congressional leaders reporting U.S. participation in the MNF, 29 September 1982. Formal request, approximately 1,200 Marines, noncombat agreement and self-defense.

Human consequences

Specialist scholarship records civilian deaths from the February 1984 U.S. naval bombardment; a reliable total remains unavailable. [LBN37] The 1958 figure of 2,000–4,000 concerns civil-war casualties, not necessarily deaths or casualties caused by U.S. forces. [LBN38] Al-Hout’s Sabra and Shatila tally of 906 dead and 484 missing concerns a separate massacre by Lebanese militia perpetrators; it is not a direct U.S. killing count. [LBN26, LBN27]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$63 million in FY1983 and US$59.743 million estimated in FY1984

The FY1983 figure is DoD’s incremental-cost estimate. Reagan’s final report separately estimated FY1984 Marine, Navy and Army participation costs. The two accounting bases are not reconciled. The 1958 deployment and net cost of military-aid loans are undetermined.

≈$389M in 2025 USD

Each fiscal-year amount uses its calendar-year CPI-U.

The taxpayer subtotal covers prima facie findings of aggression or assistance to aggression.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 31 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case LBN-1958-84-01.