Conduct and chronology
Dates and phases
17 June 2004–24 January 2018 in the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s (TBIJ) confirmed series. Some accounts date the first strike, which killed Nek Muhammad, to 18 June 2004. The campaign escalated from 2008, peaked in 2010 and then declined. TBIJ lists the 4 July 2018 report as a possible strike outside the confirmed total. [PK1, PK2, PK3]
Obama’s presidency ran from 20 January 2009 to 20 January 2017. TBIJ records his first two strikes on 23 January 2009 and his last on 21 May 2016. The principal challenged phase followed Parliament’s 12 April 2012 cessation demand, especially in 2012–2013. Related episodes include Abbottabad (2 May 2011 local time), Salala (25–26 November 2011), the January 2015 hostage deaths and the Mansur strike (21 May 2016). [PK1, PK6, PK10, PK11, PK12, PK14, PK17, PK18, PK18A]
Intervention documented
The United States conducted aerial and missile bombardment through a predominantly CIA-run remotely piloted aircraft campaign, with intelligence collection and targeting that included reported behavior-based 'signature strikes'. It also carried out the special-operations raid at Abbottabad and cross-border military fire at Salala. Pakistani assistance, covert approval, public opposition and restrictions varied over time. [PK1, PK2, PK3, PK5, PK6, PK10, PK11, PK12, PK15, PK18, PK18A]
Legal assessment
Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted
Repeated U.S. strikes after Parliament’s 12 April 2012 cessation demand provide the clearest prima facie case of aggression. TBIJ records 64 confirmed strikes after that demand through December 2013; the UN Special Rapporteur described the parliamentary consent procedure and Pakistan’s continuing objection. [PK1, PK17, PK18, PK18A, PL1]
Consent and self-defense must be assessed by period and operation: earlier Pakistani cooperation, reported June 2014 approval and cross-border armed-group threats do not establish authority for every strike. Abbottabad, Salala and Mansur rest on distinct facts and asserted justifications. [PK3, PK6, PK8, PK10, PK11, PK12, PK15, PK16, PL2]
immediate cessation of drone attacks
The UN Special Rapporteur recorded this requirement from Pakistan’s April 2012 parliamentary resolution.
[PL1] Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, interim report A/68/389, 18 September 2013, paras. 53–54, printed p. 15. Earlier Pakistani cooperation, Parliament’s 12 April 2012 cessation demand and consent procedure, and the new government’s objection.Human consequences
TBIJ reports 2,515–4,026 deaths in 430 confirmed strikes from 2004 to 2018, including combatants and civilians. This includes 2,089–3,406 deaths in 373 strikes under Obama, with 257–634 reported civilian deaths and 66–78 child deaths; children overlap the other categories and are not added again. The ranges reflect TBIJ’s compilation of reported deaths. [PK1]
Amnesty documented drone strikes that killed Mamana Bibi and people at Zowi Sidgi, and the injuries and lasting harm to survivors. Obama acknowledged that a January 2015 U.S. operation accidentally killed Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto. [PK9, PK14]
Sources for victim figures
- Reported deaths in confirmed strikes, including Obama-era civilian and child deaths
- Individual strike victims documented by Amnesty and the White House
- [PK9] Amnesty International, ‘Will I be next?’ US drone strikes in Pakistan, ASA 33/013/2013, October 2013, pp. 7–11 (scope and methodology), 18–29 (Mamana Bibi, Zowi Sidgi and rescuer attacks), 31–33 and 39–42 (fear and economic/medical harms), 43–55 (law and complicity).
- [PK14] Barack Obama, Statement on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, 23 April 2015, acknowledgment, responsibility, intelligence limitations and announced review.
Physical destruction
Amnesty International documented damage to homes and vehicles in the drone-strike incidents it investigated. Families also reported losses and costs after the strikes.
- [PK9] Amnesty International, ‘Will I be next?’ US drone strikes in Pakistan, ASA 33/013/2013, October 2013, pp. 7–11 (scope and methodology), 18–29 (Mamana Bibi, Zowi Sidgi and rescuer attacks), 31–33 and 39–42 (fear and economic/medical harms), 43–55 (law and complicity).
- [PK13] Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and NYU Global Justice Clinic, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, September 2012, Executive Summary pp. v–viii, methodology, chapter 3 and Appendix A, pp. 150–152.
Economic costs
Cost to U.S. taxpayers
The reviewed records do not isolate the budget for the CIA drone campaign. U.S. assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan cover other activities. Shared Afghanistan-theater costs are not allocated a second time.
A qualifying amount for the taxpayer subtotal is undetermined.
Economic cost to victims
Unquantified
Sources and citation
Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.
- [PK2] BIJ, Pakistan: Reported US strikes 2018, entries for 24 January and possible 4 July strike; distinctions between confirmed/possible and disputed cross-border location.
- [PK3] Mark Mazzetti (New York Times), A secret deal on drones, sealed in blood, 7 April 2013, original investigation syndicated by Mint; opening-strike bargain and covert cooperation.
- [PK4] K. Alan Kronstadt, Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary, R41832, 21 October 2011, Summary; pp. 1,18-20,32-36; sections on militant sanctuaries, government/security institutions, human rights and assistance. Official DOJ-hosted copy
- [PK5] PBS FRONTLINE, Why the U.S. Doesn't Always Know Who It's Killing in Drone Strikes, 23 April 2015, section explaining signature targeting and its 2008 Pakistan origins. Reporting, not a released targeting directive.
- [PK6] White House, Press Briefing by Jay Carney and John Brennan, 2 May 2011, Abbottabad operation, Pakistan notification, planning and leadership passages.
- [PK9] Amnesty International, ‘Will I be next?’ US drone strikes in Pakistan, ASA 33/013/2013, October 2013, pp. 7–11 (scope and methodology), 18–29 (Mamana Bibi, Zowi Sidgi and rescuer attacks), 31–33 and 39–42 (fear and economic/medical harms), 43–55 (law and complicity).
- [PK10] U.S. Central Command, Release of Pakistan/Afghanistan Cross-border Fire Investigation Report, December 2011 (page header 22 December; release-body dateline 26 December); investigation of 25-26 November engagement, 24 killed/13 wounded, coordination failures and U.S. self-defense account. This is the U.S. investigative account, disputed by Pakistan.
- [PK10] Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, Communications Failures Contributed to Border Incident, December 2011, official DVIDS reproduction (displayed event date 21 December 2011; reposted 3 July 2025). Reports the U.S. Salala investigation and its self-defense account, not an independent adjudication.
Show 17 additional references
- [PK12] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, 22 May 2016, notification after Mansur strike and sovereignty objection, reproduced in full by Bill Roggio, Pakistan protests US airstrike on Mansour as 'a violation of sovereignty,' Long War Journal, 22 May 2016. Original ministry link unavailable; quotation/position verified through this reproduction.
- Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan expressed concern over drone strike, 23 May 2016, summoning U.S. Ambassador David Hale and challenging the 21 May attack’s legality.
- [PK13] Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and NYU Global Justice Clinic, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, September 2012, Executive Summary pp. v–viii, methodology, chapter 3 and Appendix A, pp. 150–152.
- [PK15] BIJ, Six-month update: US covert actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, 1 July 2014, Pakistan section. Reproduces Reuters reporting that a senior Pakistani official said June strikes had express government/army approval despite public condemnation; attributed contrary evidence, not an authenticated consent instrument.
- Reuters, Drones hit Taliban hideouts in ‘joint Pakistan-U.S.’ raid: Officials, 12 June 2014. Anonymous senior officials’ account of government and military approval, reproduced by The Indian Express; attributed reporting rather than an authenticated consent instrument.
- [PK16] Congressional Research Service, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, R41307, 13 January 2011, sections on the Obama strategy, armed drone strikes, Pakistani protest and U.S. assistance. CRS report reproduction.
- [PK17] National Assembly of Pakistan, Resolution on Guidelines for Terms of Engagement with USA/NATO/ISAF and General Foreign Policy, 12 April 2012, item 2(i). Official page indexed in search; direct retrieval timed out. Adoption and consent provisions are also reproduced in A/68/389, paras. 53–54 [PL1].
- [PK18] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Drone attacks, 4 June 2012. Official statement of Pakistan’s position.
- [PK18A] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism visited Pakistan to study the civilian impact of the use of drones, 15 March 2013. Official statement of Pakistan’s position.
- [PK19] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan Condemns US Drone Strike in North Waziristan, 24 September 2014. Official objection despite Pakistan’s ongoing counterterrorism operations.
- [PK1] Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA and US military drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present. Original dataset checked 1 October and 10 November 2026. “Summary tables and casualty rates” A1:J17 gives annual and campaign totals, and A19:J22 gives the presidential allocation, including Obama in row 21. “Drone strikes data” rows 2 and 431 give the confirmed series endpoints. Rows 53–425 give Ob1–Ob373, with the challenged-period entries Ob269–Ob332 in rows 321–384. “Notes” rows 2, 14, 16 and 20 explain scope and methodology.
- [PK11] Barack Obama, Statement on the Death of Taliban Leader Mansur, 23 May 2016, paragraphs 1-3 and closing paragraph.
- [PK14] Barack Obama, Statement on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, 23 April 2015, acknowledgment, responsibility, intelligence limitations and announced review.
- [PK7] White House, What's New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 27 March 2009, sections 'An Attainable Objective,' 'A Regional Approach,' 'Using All Elements of National Power.'
- [PK8] Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University, 23 May 2013, passages on AUMF/self-defense, drones, civilian casualties, sovereignty and bin Laden operation.
- [PL1] Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, interim report A/68/389, 18 September 2013, paras. 53–54, printed p. 15. Earlier Pakistani cooperation, Parliament’s 12 April 2012 cessation demand and consent procedure, and the new government’s objection.
- [PL2] International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 2001, art. 20 and commentary paras. 3–6, 9 (freely given, established, prior consent and its limits).
Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case PAK-2004-18-01.
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