Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

May–December 1967: crisis support and diplomacy; Israeli offensives, 5–10 June; immediate occupation; postwar arms releases and settlement diplomacy through Security Council Resolution 242 on 22 November; first four U.S. A-4H aircraft delivered in December, confirmed in McNamara’s 7 January 1968 assessment. Earlier 1964–1966 arms agreements are enabling antecedents. Later wars and decades of occupation are not added to the 1967 death toll. [67-1, 67-2, 67-3, 67-4, 67-9, 67-30; 67-L4]

Intervention documented

Prewar military support included a completed tank agreement, credit and training. The first four aircraft under the 1966 A-4H contract were delivered in December 1967. [67-1, 67-2, 67-3]

U.S. intelligence liaison and diplomatic contacts continued during the crisis, alongside presidential warnings against initiating war. The 5 June control-group minutes permitted material already dispatched to continue and approved charter-flight transshipment. The 8 June rules imposed an arms freeze with existing-license exceptions. These records document permissions and releases; they do not establish completion of every authorized delivery. [67-6, 67-6a, 67-7, 67-8, 67-9, 67-9a]

U.S. fleet movement during the Soviet crisis combined deterrence with pressure on Israel for a ceasefire. The FRUS investigation found no corroboration for allegations of direct U.S. RF-4C reconnaissance support for Israeli combat. Helms’s draft postmortem stated that overhead collection yielded no intelligence during the fighting. [67-11, 67-11a, 67-12, 67-33]

Washington released postwar supplies and delivered aircraft with knowledge of apparent territorial-retention plans and settlements. Official U.S. guidance also opposed converting victory into territorial gains, but the implemented military support strengthened Israel’s ability to sustain its occupation. [67-27, 67-28, 67-29, 67-29a, 67-30, 67-31, 67-31a, 67-34; 67-L3, 67-L10]

Legal assessment

Prima facie case of U.S. responsibility for aiding or assisting another state’s aggression; formal investigation warranted

Prima facie U.S. responsibility for assisting aggression through renewed military supplies supporting territorial occupation. The 7 April Israeli–Syrian clash followed disputed cultivation in the demilitarized zone and escalated into artillery, tank and air combat. The contemporary U.S. account said Syrian forces fired on an Israeli tractor but expressly lacked a UN observer report or a basis to assess Israel’s cultivation claim. The UN Yearbook records competing Israeli and Syrian allegations. [67-35, 67-36]

Israel initiated the 5 June offensive against Egypt and brought Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights under occupation. The bombardment, invasions, territorial seizures and casualties establish the operation’s gravity. On 26 May U.S. intelligence rejected Israel’s claim that Egypt was preparing an attack; on 5 June a provisional CIA analysis suggested Israel fired first. The intelligence record strengthens the prima facie case against the claimed defensive necessity. [67-5, 67-23, 67-18; 67-L4]

Johnson approved a renewed supply program on 13 October, after officials reported apparent Israeli plans to retain Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank, and after discussions of settlements. Rusk and McNamara reported that missing U.S. parts had “severely hampered” Israeli military maintenance and recommended approximately $30 million in spare parts, components and supplies; an 18 October conversation addressed resumed deliveries. McNamara subsequently confirmed that the first four A-4H aircraft were delivered in December 1967. These decisions and implemented deliveries materially supported Israel’s continued occupation and territorial entrenchment. The approximately $30 million was an approved program value, not a verified total of completed deliveries. [67-27, 67-28, 67-30, 67-31a, 67-3; 67-L3, 67-L10]

An analysis of presently available information suggests that Israel fired the first shots today.

The CIA’s provisional analysis of 5 June 1967 used this qualified formulation. It also recorded Israel’s account that it was responding to Egyptian air and armored movements.

[67-23] FRUS XIX, doc. 169, CIA/OCI, 5 June 1967, paras. 1–3: contemporary assessment that Israel probably fired first and conflicting Israeli accounts.

Human consequences

A secondary historical synthesis reports approximately 20,000 Arab and 800 Israeli deaths in the June war. These deaths preceded the later U.S. supply decisions supporting occupation; the estimates do not measure deaths caused by that assistance. [67-18]

UN reports identify large, differently dated displacement cohorts from the West Bank, Syria and Sinai, and describe demolitions and impediments to return. They provide no mortality total attributable to later U.S. support for consolidation. [67-15, 67-16]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$23.7 million in U.S. assistance to Israel in FY1967, including US$7 million in military loans

The CRS series includes loans and other assistance across the fiscal year. The workbook records arms sales and releases of equipment against existing credit. It does not establish a war-specific net fiscal cost.

≈$228M in 2025 USD

The full fiscal-year assistance benchmark uses 1967 CPI-U of 33.4.

The aid series covers broader programs and includes repayable loans.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 40 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case ISR-1967-01.