Conduct and chronology
Dates and phases
May–December 1967: crisis support and diplomacy; Israeli offensives, 5–10 June; immediate occupation; postwar arms releases and settlement diplomacy through Security Council Resolution 242 on 22 November; first four U.S. A-4H aircraft delivered in December, confirmed in McNamara’s 7 January 1968 assessment. Earlier 1964–1966 arms agreements are enabling antecedents. Later wars and decades of occupation are not added to the 1967 death toll. [67-1, 67-2, 67-3, 67-4, 67-9, 67-30; 67-L4]
Intervention documented
Prewar military support included a completed tank agreement, credit and training. The first four aircraft under the 1966 A-4H contract were delivered in December 1967. [67-1, 67-2, 67-3]
U.S. intelligence liaison and diplomatic contacts continued during the crisis, alongside presidential warnings against initiating war. The 5 June control-group minutes permitted material already dispatched to continue and approved charter-flight transshipment. The 8 June rules imposed an arms freeze with existing-license exceptions. These records document permissions and releases; they do not establish completion of every authorized delivery. [67-6, 67-6a, 67-7, 67-8, 67-9, 67-9a]
U.S. fleet movement during the Soviet crisis combined deterrence with pressure on Israel for a ceasefire. The FRUS investigation found no corroboration for allegations of direct U.S. RF-4C reconnaissance support for Israeli combat. Helms’s draft postmortem stated that overhead collection yielded no intelligence during the fighting. [67-11, 67-11a, 67-12, 67-33]
Washington released postwar supplies and delivered aircraft with knowledge of apparent territorial-retention plans and settlements. Official U.S. guidance also opposed converting victory into territorial gains, but the implemented military support strengthened Israel’s ability to sustain its occupation. [67-27, 67-28, 67-29, 67-29a, 67-30, 67-31, 67-31a, 67-34; 67-L3, 67-L10]
Legal assessment
Prima facie case of U.S. responsibility for aiding or assisting another state’s aggression; formal investigation warranted
Prima facie U.S. responsibility for assisting aggression through renewed military supplies supporting territorial occupation. The 7 April Israeli–Syrian clash followed disputed cultivation in the demilitarized zone and escalated into artillery, tank and air combat. The contemporary U.S. account said Syrian forces fired on an Israeli tractor but expressly lacked a UN observer report or a basis to assess Israel’s cultivation claim. The UN Yearbook records competing Israeli and Syrian allegations. [67-35, 67-36]
Israel initiated the 5 June offensive against Egypt and brought Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights under occupation. The bombardment, invasions, territorial seizures and casualties establish the operation’s gravity. On 26 May U.S. intelligence rejected Israel’s claim that Egypt was preparing an attack; on 5 June a provisional CIA analysis suggested Israel fired first. The intelligence record strengthens the prima facie case against the claimed defensive necessity. [67-5, 67-23, 67-18; 67-L4]
Johnson approved a renewed supply program on 13 October, after officials reported apparent Israeli plans to retain Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank, and after discussions of settlements. Rusk and McNamara reported that missing U.S. parts had “severely hampered” Israeli military maintenance and recommended approximately $30 million in spare parts, components and supplies; an 18 October conversation addressed resumed deliveries. McNamara subsequently confirmed that the first four A-4H aircraft were delivered in December 1967. These decisions and implemented deliveries materially supported Israel’s continued occupation and territorial entrenchment. The approximately $30 million was an approved program value, not a verified total of completed deliveries. [67-27, 67-28, 67-30, 67-31a, 67-3; 67-L3, 67-L10]
An analysis of presently available information suggests that Israel fired the first shots today.
The CIA’s provisional analysis of 5 June 1967 used this qualified formulation. It also recorded Israel’s account that it was responding to Egyptian air and armored movements.
[67-23] FRUS XIX, doc. 169, CIA/OCI, 5 June 1967, paras. 1–3: contemporary assessment that Israel probably fired first and conflicting Israeli accounts.Human consequences
A secondary historical synthesis reports approximately 20,000 Arab and 800 Israeli deaths in the June war. These deaths preceded the later U.S. supply decisions supporting occupation; the estimates do not measure deaths caused by that assistance. [67-18]
UN reports identify large, differently dated displacement cohorts from the West Bank, Syria and Sinai, and describe demolitions and impediments to return. They provide no mortality total attributable to later U.S. support for consolidation. [67-15, 67-16]
Sources for victim figures
- Estimated Arab and Israeli deaths in the June 1967 war
- Displacement reported after the June 1967 war
- U.N. Secretary-General, Report under Security Council Resolution 237 (1967), A/6797–S/8158, 2 October 1967, section III
- [67-15] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1967, printed pp. 239–240 (Gussing mission, demolitions, return), 260–261 (UNRWA summer report and December update). Official PDF downloaded and text verified; page viewer may restrict access.
Physical destruction
The UN fact-finding mission and the International Committee of the Red Cross documented demolitions and damage to homes in territories occupied after the June war.
- [67-15] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1967, printed pp. 239–240 (Gussing mission, demolitions, return), 260–261 (UNRWA summer report and December update). Official PDF downloaded and text verified; page viewer may restrict access.
- [67-16] ICRC, “The Middle East Activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross—June 1967–June 1970,” part II, International Review of the Red Cross, September 1970, pp. 485–486: observed destruction, residents' accounts and Israeli response. Library of Congress reproduction
Economic costs
Cost to U.S. taxpayers
US$23.7 million in U.S. assistance to Israel in FY1967, including US$7 million in military loans
The CRS series includes loans and other assistance across the fiscal year. The workbook records arms sales and releases of equipment against existing credit. It does not establish a war-specific net fiscal cost.
≈$228M in 2025 USD
The full fiscal-year assistance benchmark uses 1967 CPI-U of 33.4.
The aid series covers broader programs and includes repayable loans.
Economic cost to victims
Unquantified
Sources and citation
Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.
- [67-1] FRUS XVIII, doc. 99, Feldman/Bundy/Komer to Johnson, 19 October 1964, with Rusk's 10 October attachment and approval notes: tanks, training, credit, indirect defense subsidy.
- [67-2] FRUS XVIII, doc. 230, Komer to Johnson, 29 July 1965, completed tank agreement and $42m amount.
- [67-3] FRUS XX, doc. 38, Rostow to Johnson conveying McNamara's aircraft assessment, 7 January 1968, “A-4H Skyhawks” section: June 1966 contract and December 1967 first deliveries.
- [67-4] FRUS XIX, doc. 7, Rostow to Johnson, 17 May 1967, crisis/background.
- [67-4a] Volume summary, prewar crisis, war and postwar diplomacy sections; compare its broad wartime-supply statement with [67-9].
- [67-5] FRUS XIX, doc. 73, Watch Committee Special Report 874A, 26 May 1967, para. 1, imminent-attack assessment.
- [67-5a] Doc. 76, CIA, Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States, 26 May, Summary: qualitative advantage and costs of allowing Egypt to strike first.
- [67-6] FRUS XIX, doc. 77, Johnson–Eban meeting, 26 May 1967, pp. 140–146: restraint, intelligence, liaison.
Show 40 additional references
- [67-6a] Doc. 139, Johnson to Eshkol, 3 June, pp. 263–264, renewed warning after Amit visit.
- [67-7] FRUS XIX, doc. 124, Rufus Taylor's memorandum of McNamara–Amit conversation, 1 June 1967, paras. 2, 5, 7–9; fn. 2 reproduces Amit's 1992 recollection.
- [67-8] FRUS XIX, doc. 97, State to Tel Aviv, 29 May 1967, fn. 2: May 28 intelligence-exchange decision and liaison limits.
- [67-9] FRUS XIX, doc. 165, Middle East Control Group minutes, 5 June 1967, I.1, II.2 and fn. 2: arms already dispatched and five charter flights.
- [67-9a] Doc. 225, McNamara to Bundy, 8 June, paras. 1–2, a–c and fn. 2: restrictions and existing-license exceptions.
- [67-10] FRUS XIX, doc. 189, Walt Rostow to Johnson, 7 June 1967, sections III–V: settlement strategy and regional objectives.
- [67-10a] Doc. 226, Townsend Hoopes to McNamara, 8 June, opening analysis (seen by McNamara June 9): Nasser and Soviet influence; staff assessment, not an attack order.
- [67-11] Harold H. Saunders, memorandum for the record, 22 October 1968, “Hot Line Meeting June 10, 1967,” FRUS XIX, doc. 244: Richard Helms’s retrospective account of fleet movement and pressure for an Israeli ceasefire.
- [67-11a] Doc. 239, Rusk to Tel Aviv, 9 June 1967, demand for effective Syrian-front ceasefire.
- [67-12] FRUS XIX, doc. 262, Editorial Note: review of Stephen Green's U.S. RF-4C reconnaissance allegation; no corroboration found in FRUS/Air Force research, and Parker's contrary findings.
- [67-13] Clyde R. Mark, CRS, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, IB85066, 26 April 2005, Table 3, printed pp. 13–14, FY1965–67 rows (including continuation columns). Official CRS report reproduced at EveryCRSReport
- [67-14] BLS, Historical CPI-U, Table 24, printed p. 2, 1967 annual average 33.4.
- [67-14a] Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Overview Table, U.S. city average, 2025 annual average 321.943.
- [67-15] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1967, printed pp. 239–241 (Gussing mission, demolitions, return), 260–261 (UNRWA summer report and December update). UN fact-finding reports distinguish observations, allegations and Israeli responses.
- [67-16] ICRC, “The Middle East Activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross—June 1967–June 1970,” part II, International Review of the Red Cross, September 1970, pp. 485–486: observed destruction, residents' accounts and Israeli response. Library of Congress reproduction
- [67-17] SNIE 30–3–67, The Short-Term Arab–Israeli Military Balance, 10 August 1967, para. 2, pp. 771–772, FRUS XIX, doc. 414.
- [67-18] HISTORY.com Editors, “Six-Day War,” updated 28 May 2025, “Israel Celebrates Victory” section, approximate deaths; chronology in preceding sections. Secondary synthesis, not registry data.
- [67-19] Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965–1968 (Office of Joint History, 2012), pp. 175–176, “Attack on USS Liberty”; official PDF verified locally.
- [67-20] FRUS XIX, doc. 108, State to Tel Aviv, 1 June 1967, recording 31 May Harman–Eugene Rostow conversation, para. 11: M48 upgrades and new requests, not proof of delivery.
- [67-21] FRUS XIX, doc. 132, Rusk–Harman conversation, 2 June 1967, pp. 247–251: reported Egyptian assurances, Israeli threat assessment, diplomatic alternatives and warnings against initiating war.
- [67-22] FRUS XIX, doc. 144, Walt Rostow to Johnson, 4 June 1967, sections I, IV–V, VII: weakening Nasser, preference for a settlement without war, possible maritime probes and limits on secret coordination. Proposal, not evidence that the proposed scenario was executed.
- [67-23] FRUS XIX, doc. 169, CIA/OCI, 5 June 1967, paras. 1–3: contemporary assessment that Israel probably fired first and conflicting Israeli accounts.
- [67-24] FRUS XIX, doc. 203, State to Tel Aviv, 8 June 1967, main text and fns. 2–3: U.S. objection to an offensive on Syrian soil after ceasefire acceptance, UNTSO report and ambassador's account of continuing Syrian shelling of communities below the heights.
- [67-35] FRUS XVIII, doc. 402, State Department circular telegram, 7 April 1967, para. 1: provisional account of the disputed-cultivation clash, reciprocal military claims and explicit absence of a UN observer report at that time.
- [67-25] FRUS XIX, doc. 191, Burns to State, 7 June 1967, paras. 1–7 and fn. 4: Jordanian ceasefire acceptance; rejection of alleged deception; proposed presidential message apparently not forwarded by Rostow.
- [67-26] FRUS XIX, doc. 166, Walt Rostow to Johnson, 5 June 1967, 5:45 p.m.: territorial gains as bargaining leverage alongside efforts to shorten the war.
- [67-27] FRUS XIX, doc. 399, McGeorge Bundy to Johnson, 31 July 1967, paras. 1–2: knowledge of apparent plans to retain territory and recommendation to tolerate faits accomplis; expressly notes possible disagreement by Rusk.
- [67-28] FRUS XIX, doc. 451, State to Tel Aviv, 29 September 1967, para. 4 and notes 3–4: September 28 discussion of settlements, public disagreement and territorial-acquisition concerns.
- [67-29] FRUS XIX, doc. 403, Hoopes memorandum, 1 August 1967: presidential-endorsed $3m supply exception.
- [67-29a] FRUS XIX, doc. 406, Rostow to Johnson, 3 August 1967, main text and note 2: overlap with $14m credit and McNamara's August 10 release authorization.
- [67-30] FRUS XIX, doc. 472, Rusk/McNamara to Johnson, 13 October 1967, Israeli supply section and note 1: impaired maintenance capacity, approximately $30m supply approvals, A-4 schedule, parallel Arab supply and recorded presidential approval.
- [67-31] FRUS XIX, doc. 468, Rostow to Johnson, 12 October 1967, paras. 1–2 and note 5: McNamara letter releasing backlog and reconfirming aircraft schedule.
- [67-31a] FRUS XIX, doc. 477, McNamara–Harman conversation, 18 October 1967: implementation consultations on resumed deliveries and future requests.
- [67-32] FRUS XIX, doc. 473, Rostow–Evron conversation, 13 October 1967: expressly personal assessment of U.S. strategic/diplomatic protection; presidential read notation in note 1.
- [67-33] FRUS XIX, doc. 297, Helms draft briefing, 14 June 1967, collection section I.A, VI.C and XIII: no overhead-reconnaissance intelligence during fighting and deficient tactical reporting; prepared for June 15–16 meeting, minutes not found.
- [67-34] FRUS XIX, doc. 396, State to Tel Aviv, 29 July 1967, paras. 5–6 and note 1: presidential-approved guidance against territorial gains, for territorial integrity; internal as well as external policy.
- [67-L10] ILC, Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries (2001), Article 16 commentary (1), (3)–(5), (10), printed pp. 65–67; Article 41(2), commentary (11)–(12), pp. 114–115: significant assistance, distinction from co-perpetration, and maintenance of situations created by serious peremptory breaches. Later formulation, requiring assessment of the law applicable in 1967.
- [67-L3] ILC, Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 16 and commentary (1), (3)–(5), (8), pp. 225–228 in UN Materials on Responsibility of States: assistance distinct from attribution; knowledge, intended facilitation and significant contribution. Later codification, not an automatic retroactive finding.
- [67-L4] UN Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967, preamble and paras. 1–2, reproduced in FRUS XIX, doc. 542: acquisition of territory by war, withdrawal and peace framework.
- [67-36] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1967, printed pp. 158–160, “Communications concerning relations between Israel and Syria”: cultivation dispute, UN-sponsored talks and separately attributed Israeli and Syrian accounts of the 7 April clash.
Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case ISR-1967-01.
Palestine
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