Conduct and chronology
Dates and phases
February 1965–1967. A covert political program was proposed on 23 February and approved on 4 March. Core violent phase: Army-led killings and mass detention after the 30 September–1 October 1965 events, with U.S. covert encouragement and assistance in late 1965–1966. Consolidation: removal of Sukarno’s mandate and Suharto’s investiture as acting president on 12 March 1967, followed by continued political/military support. [IN65-01, IN65-07, IN65-14]
Earlier military training and aid, including the post-1958 policy shift and December 1961 covert authorization, are antecedents. The mass-killing estimates principally concern 1965–66; later imprisonment, discrimination and New Order violence retain their own dates. Neither the entire dictatorship nor the separate East Timor invasion is included as one continuous 1965 operation.
Intervention documented
Covert political action, anti-PKI propaganda planning and encouragement; provision of intelligence lists; medical-supply approvals and military communications assistance, technical expertise and training; concurrence in funding an Army-coordinated civilian repression organization; later military aid and political backing for the new regime. These were purposeful contributions to a violent power struggle, with different levels of proof for proposals, approvals and actual implementation. [IN65-01, IN65-03, IN65-09, IN65-10, IN65-11, IN65-12, IN65-20]
Legal assessment
Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted
Prima facie indirect U.S. aggression through covert assistance supporting the Army’s forcible displacement of presidential authority. Approved and implemented military assistance, operational relationships and political backing formed substantive contributions to armed coercion against Indonesia’s political independence. [IN65-01, IN65-09, IN65-12, IN65-18, IN65-19, IN65-20] The legal finding rests on substantial involvement in that coercive campaign, with the precise operational contribution requiring further investigation. [IL2, IL3, IL4] Knowing assistance to mass atrocities also supplies a separate basis for investigating state responsibility. [IN65-06, IN65-10, IN65-11, IN65-17, IL4]
increasing respect for its determination and organization in carrying out this crucial assignment
Ambassador Marshall Green used these words in an October 1965 cable on the Indonesian Army’s campaign.
[IN65-06] Green telegram, 20 October 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 158, paras. 3–5 and note 3; execution reports, approval of Army campaign and lack of evidence of planned PKI insurgency.Human consequences
Historical scholarship estimates approximately 500,000 killed in the Army-led 1965–1966 massacres and more than one million detained. [IN65-15] The wider literature gives estimates of 500,000–1,000,000; these are historical estimates across the Army-led campaign, not a statistical confidence interval. [IN65-16] Torture, sexual violence, forced labor, and enduring persecution are documented, including in material examined by Indonesia’s human-rights commissions and the independent, nonbinding IPT inquiry. [IN65-17]
Sources for victim figures
- Estimated killings and detentions during the Indonesian Army campaign
- [IN65-15] Geoffrey B. Robinson, The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66 (Princeton, 2018), author’s UCLA publication summary; approximately 500,000 killed and more than one million detained.
- [IN65-16] Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: US Documents Released on 1965–66 Massacres, 18 October 2017, paragraph beginning Starting in October; 500,000–1,000,000 historical mortality estimates.
Economic costs
Cost to U.S. taxpayers
50 million rupiahs in proposed covert assistance in December 1965
U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green concurred in the proposed amount for an anti-PKI group. A payment receipt and a defensible exchange-rate conversion are unavailable. Costs of the separate communications program remain redacted.
The concurrence records a proposal. Verified expenditure is undetermined.
- Green telegram, 2 December 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 179, paras. 1–2; concurrence in 50 million rupiahs for Army-coordinated Kap-Gestapu.
- 303 Committee memorandum, 17 November 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 175, Problem, Operational Objectives, Training and note 3; secure military communications and December procurement.
Economic cost to victims
Unquantified
Sources and citation
Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.
- [IC1] Economic Report of the President 2003, Table B-60, BLS CPI-U annual averages: 1958=28.9; 1959=29.1; 1961=29.9; 1965=31.5; 1967=33.4.
- [IC2] Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI-U series CUUR0000SA0, 2025 annual average M13=321.943; study’s common conversion base.
- [IL1] UN Charter, Articles 2(4),39–42,51; contemporaneous prohibition of force and exceptions.
- [IL2] UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, annex Articles 1–3,5–6; later comparative definition, including bombardment and armed groups/substantial involvement.
- [IL3] ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, 27 June 1986, paras. 115–116,195,228,246; primary judgment reproduced by Justia.
- [IL4] ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, Articles 4,8,16 and Article 16 commentary paras. 1,3–6,10; assistance responsibility distinguished from attribution.
- [IL5] UN Audiovisual Library of International Law, Articles on State Responsibility, procedural history; UNGA Resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001, took note of and annexed the articles, without adopting them as a treaty.
- [IN65-04] CIA memorandum, 6 October 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 149, para. 6; Sukarno’s delegation of security responsibilities to Suharto.
Show 21 additional references
- [IN65-05] Green telegram, 14 October 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 155, paras. 1–3 and note 3; three Motorola radios for senior Army officers’ guards.
- [IN65-06] Green telegram, 20 October 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 158, paras. 3–5 and note 3; execution reports, approval of Army campaign and lack of evidence of planned PKI insurgency.
- [IN65-07] FRUS XXVI, doc. 162, editorial note, pp. 338–340; contemporary massacre reports, Embassy airgram A–641 of 15 April 1966, and Howland’s 1970 mortality estimate.
- [IN65-08] CIA memorandum, 9 November 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 172, paras. 1,7–9; disputed governmental authority and proposed covert arms/credits, expressly not yet recommended for supply.
- [IN65-09] 303 Committee memorandum, 17 November 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 175, Problem, Operational Objectives, Training and note 3; secure military communications and December procurement.
- [IN65-10] Green telegram, 2 December 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 179, paras. 1–2; concurrence in 50 million rupiahs for Army-coordinated Kap-Gestapu.
- [IN65-11] FRUS XXVI, doc. 185, editorial note, especially airgram A–74, 10 August 1966; lists furnished in December 1965 and Martens’s disputed retrospective account.
- [IN65-12] 303 Committee memorandum, 17 June 1966, FRUS XXVI, doc. 211, summary, factors, operational objectives and notes 3–4: equipment diverted from Djakarta stocks, technical briefings, proposed expansion and 24 June approval. The original equipment was not supplied as recommended; a completed nationwide communications network is not established.
- [IN65-13] Robert McNamara to Johnson, 1 March 1967, FRUS XXVI, doc. 232, pp. 493–495; cumulative military resources, interruptions, FY1967 decisions and contribution assessment.
- [IN65-14] Green telegram, 15 March 1967, FRUS XXVI, doc. 233, paras. 1–8 and note 2; Sukarno’s removal, Suharto’s 12 March investiture and continuing operations.
- [IN65-15] Geoffrey B. Robinson, The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66 (Princeton, 2018), author’s UCLA publication summary; approximately 500,000 killed and more than one million detained.
- [IN65-16] Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: US Documents Released on 1965–66 Massacres, 18 October 2017, paragraph beginning Starting in October; 500,000–1,000,000 historical mortality estimates.
- [IN65-20] Department of State to Embassy Bangkok, 4 November 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 170, paras. 1–5 and note 1; covert medical supplies approval and separate unresolved arms requests.
- [IN65-18] Samuel D. Berger to Dean Rusk, “Recent Developments in Indonesia,” 14 March 1966, FRUS XXVI, doc. 202, para. 4: reported Army ultimatum and Sukarno’s transfer of security responsibility; prospective economic aid distinguished.
- [IN65-19] Marshall Green, telegram 2579, 12 March 1966, FRUS XXVI, doc. 200, paras. 1, 3 and 6–7: Embassy’s characterization of the March power transfer as a military coup, Sukarno’s continued formal role, and limits on overt Western backing.
- [IN65-17] International People’s Tribunal 1965, Final Report, 20 July 2016, sections A1 (independent inquiry), B3–B5 (imprisonment, torture, sexual violence and persecution), B7 (foreign complicity), C (findings), and appendices D1.e–f (Indonesian commission material). Full HTML publication by the inquiry; nonbinding, not an international criminal court.
- [IN65-01] 303 Committee memorandum, 23 February 1965, FRUS 1964–1968, XXVI, doc. 110, objectives, timing and notes 2–3; covert political program approved 4 March and separate December 1961 antecedent.
- [IN65-03] Marshall Green telegram, 5 October 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 147, paras. 3–4; covert encouragement, political objectives and propaganda.
- [IN65-02] Ellsworth Bunker report to Johnson, April 1965, FRUS XXVI, doc. 121, Part I paras. 10–12, Part III para. 2 and note 1; anti-PKI strategy and assurances to Sukarno.
- [IN65-GAL1] Amnesty International, Indonesia: Prisoners Under Sentence of Death for Alleged Offences Relating to an Attempted Coup in 1965 or Membership of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), ASA 21/23/85, July 1985, appendix printed p. 5 / PDF p. 10, Omar Dhani entry: December 1966 military trial and commutation to life on 15 December 1981.
- [IN65-GAL2] The Jakarta Post, “Ex-political prisoners reunited with families after 29 years,” 18 August 1995, contemporaneous report reproduced by Jawawa: Omar Dhani’s release and reunion after presidential clemency.
Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case IDN-1965-67-02.
Indonesia