Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

20 December 1989–31 January 1990: campaign/accounting window used by GAO. Cole’s JCS history dates operational termination to 11 January; Noriega surrendered on 3 January. The 1987–89 sanctions, covert support and military pressure are antecedents. Subsequent Promote Liberty stabilization and later proceedings have separate dates; their deaths are not automatically included. Earlier Canal Zone interventions are excluded. [PA3, pp. 63, 69; PA8, p. 1]

Intervention documented

The United States invaded Panama with aerial bombardment and ground assaults, attacked and dismantled the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), detained and removed Noriega to face U.S. criminal charges, and supported a new civilian government and reconstruction. Earlier U.S. measures included economic sanctions, intelligence/covert political assistance, clandestine broadcasting and contingency planning. Covert findings authorized work with PDF dissidents; they do not establish that Washington directed every coup attempt. [PA4, PA5, PA6, PA7]

Legal assessment

Insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of U.S. aggression or assistance to aggression; further investigation may be warranted

U.S. forces invaded Panama; the validity of presidential consent is the decisive issue for the aggression finding. Endara’s electoral victory had been annulled by the Noriega regime; the United States reported consulting him before the landing and obtaining his cooperation. [PA3, pp. 10–11; PA10; PA12, pp. 2–4] Consent could not excuse violations of humanitarian obligations. The IACHR found that U.S. operations violated rights under the American Declaration, applying the humanitarian-law principles of distinction, necessity, proportionality and precaution. Its findings cover civilian death, injury and destruction at El Chorrillo; they do not determine Endara’s authority to consent. [AC1, paras. 281–287, 394–403, 425–431, 471–472; AC2] The humanitarian and human-rights violations are established. The ad bellum question turns on the validity, timing and scope of consent and the other asserted justifications. [PA10; PA12; PL2; PL5]

we won’t get rid of him except by force and pressure

The minutes of a May 1989 National Security Council meeting record Brent Scowcroft’s assessment of how to remove Noriega.

[PA2] White House, Minutes of the NSC Meeting on Panama, 8 May 1989, pp. 4–5, Scowcroft’s description of the consensus; original declassified minutes, National Security Archive reproduction.

Human consequences

At least 300 Panamanian civilians died, according to Physicians for Human Rights; Americas Watch estimated about 300 and could not establish a reliable upper bound. [PM1, pp. 3–4, 21–23; PM2, casualty appendix] PHR also estimated 15,000 displaced and at least 3,000 civilians injured seriously enough to require emergency treatment during the invasion and its violent aftermath. [PM1, pp. 3–4] El Chorrillo and other areas suffered destruction, fire and looting. The IACHR established U.S. responsibility for disproportionate civilian-property damage. Its finding does not attribute every act of destruction or establish a comprehensive monetary total. [PM2; AC1, paras. 425–431]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

US$163.6 million in incremental DoD costs for Operation Just Cause

The estimate includes preparation and dependent evacuation. It excludes regular military pay and other routine costs. GAO reported the services’ figures.

≈$403M in 2025 USD

The 1990 CPI-U of 130.7 is the workbook’s timing proxy for the 1989–1990 operation.

The taxpayer subtotal covers prima facie findings of aggression or assistance to aggression.

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 18 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case PAN-1989-90-01.