Conduct and chronology

Dates and phases

16-19 December 1998 (standard U.S. operational dating), approximately 70 hours. The 1998 inspection crises, threatened/cancelled November attack and October Iraq Liberation Act are antecedents. Subsequent no-fly-zone clashes, sanctions, opposition assistance and the 2003 invasion are distinct phases, not included in the core campaign's costs or mortality. Source dates and local-time differences are retained where relevant. [IXP2; IX05; IX06]

Intervention documented

U.S. and UK regular armed forces launched air and naval missile attacks against Iraqi military, government/security and weapons-related targets and one oil-sector installation. Regional deployments supported the bombardment and deterred Iraqi counteraction. [IXP1; IX04, IX05, IX06]

Legal assessment

Prima facie case of U.S. aggression; formal investigation warranted

Prima facie aggression: substantial U.S.–UK bombardment without Iraqi consent or an established self-defense basis. The United States and Britain sought no fresh Security Council authorization and claimed that earlier resolutions revived authority to use force. [IXL1; IXL1A; IXL3; IXL3A; IXL4; IXL4A; IXL6, paras. 732–734; IXL7, paras. 520–523, 557.] On 15 December 1998, UNSCOM reported incomplete Iraqi cooperation, while the IAEA reported the cooperation necessary for its recent activities, with some nuclear questions unresolved. The Secretary-General described UNSCOM’s report for the period since 17 November as a mixed picture and offered Council-directed options. [IX06, pp. 55–61; IX03, paras. 11–13.] Inspectors withdrew on 16 December before the air strikes; the IAEA subsequently reported that it could no longer implement its mandate in Iraq. [IX03, para. 14; IX06, pp. 24–25.] Uncertain future risk was not an Article 51 armed attack. This assessment rejects unilateral enforcement on that basis: further enforcement action belonged with the Council. [IXL1A; IXL4; IXL4A; IXL6, paras. 732–734.]

remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein

The October 1998 Iraq Liberation Act made this a U.S. policy objective; §8 expressly disclaimed authorization to use U.S. armed forces except for the limited assistance specified in §4(a)(2).

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105–338, § 3

Human consequences

Amnesty relayed preliminary first-night reports of 30 killed and at least 100 injured in Baghdad. These reports cover the first night, not the entire campaign. [IX08, p. 1.] A separate Iraqi claim identified 62 military deaths; its reliability and overlap with other reports remain unresolved. [IX07, p. 29.] Contemporary reports described damage to residential buildings, hospitals and rice storage alongside attacks on military infrastructure. The cited sources establish no reliable campaign-wide death total; sanctions losses are excluded. [IX08; IX09; IX04.]

Sources for victim figures

Physical destruction

Economic costs

Cost to U.S. taxpayers

About US$750 million in one estimate of ordnance costs for Operation Desert Fox

The estimate includes allocated research, development and testing costs. U.S. campaign outlays remain undetermined. The U.K. separately estimated its own operation cost at about £3 million.

≈$1.48B in 2025 USD

The 1998 CPI-U of 163.0 gives the purchasing power of the ordnance estimate.

The ordnance estimate includes prior development costs and omits other campaign costs.

Economic cost to victims

Unquantified

Read the cost methodology

Sources and citation

Documentary and bibliographic references from the research edition.

Show 16 additional references

Restrepo, Ricardo. The Atlas of U.S. International Aggression: A Historical and Legal Assessment of U.S. Uses of Force. Working research edition, 10 November 2026. Case IRQ-1998-01.